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tack aircraft were placed on the target during the afternoon. Four UH-1E helicopter gunships were continuously relieved on station. Medical evacuation helicopters were airborne and standing by to pick up casualties. These helos were not used by the assault company because LZ WREN remained "hot" throughout the raid but the pilot of an A-4 attack aircraft was picked up when he ejected after his plane was damaged by .50ca1 machine gun fire during a strike on the objective area. This level of air support was necessary due to the critical time factor of the mission and that delays incurred while waiting for close air support or medical evacuation could have been sufficient to allow enemy forces to reinforce their contact units. This continuous cover included the airborne controllers, aerial observers and command and control aircraft necessary for proper employment of assets.

* preplanned ordnance. Close study of the mission, terrain and enemy capability permitted the use of preplanned ordnance throughout the raid. Napalm was used exclusively on enemy fortified areas for pre L-hour strikes while pre-arranged smoke screens were laid along enemy reinforcement withdrawal routes.

Coordination of these assets was accomplished through a company level fire support coordination group established after the first wave had landed and established landing zone security. This group consisted of the company gunnery sergeant as fire support coordinator (FSC) (the company did not have an executive officer), the artillery FO team scout sergeant, the forward air controller, a battalion 81mm mortar forward observer and the company 60mm mortar section. In addition the FSC had under his direct control a 3.5 inch rocket launcher team armed with white phosphorus rounds for marking targets. This capability on the ground allowed the airborne tactical air controller and aerial observer to concentrate on conducting airstrikes and control of air while the ground unit marked targets. The fire support coordination group maintained contact with the company commander (usually with the assault platoons) and coordinated all fire support missions and airstrikes. (The critical nature and timing of raid type operations require close coordination of all assets and their combat power must be immediately available with no time delays on utilization.) To assist in employing air assets to the maximum, blanket firing clearance was given outside the hamlet and LZ area. The company scheme of maneuver was simple and the objective area easily delineated from surrounding areas. This blanket clearance and the objective area being outside the division tactical area of operations greatly aided in isolation of the objective and prevention of enemy reinforcements. At the time of extraction two to three enemy companies were within the objective area and enemy reinforcements were moving to within striking distance of the assault company. Friendly air effectively held off these reinforcements until the extraction was complete.

Marine Corps Gazette • June 1973

Contingency planning for the assault and reinforcing company included the following:

• plans for reinforcement by a second or more companies

• plans for resupply of the assault company and establishment of a defensive position until extraction could be made the next day

• plans for partial extraction then reinsertion should a helicopter be downed, and

• plans for exploitation of the contact by reinforcing units. (The heavy commitment of assets, the commitments of units outside of normal operational areas and the possibility of gaining major contact from which disengagement would be difficult are all factors that must be weighed by the commander prior to conducting raid operations. Once the decision is made, no limit should be placed on the amount of combat support available.)

The unit effort required for this type operation is tremendous and requires the utmost in leadership ability. Each man must be prepared to assume his leader's role. This operation cost the assault company five squad leaders and one platoon commander; Marines who had to be replaced during heavy contact with no loss of combat efficiency in the unit.

This raid was psychologically significant because it demonstrated to the enemy and to his popular support base the combat capability of the Marine air-ground team. This team could insert a small unit into the center of enemy forces or havens, strike a heavy blow to a main force unit and withdraw under cover of supporting arms. Exploitation and refinement of this tactic could deny guerrillas areas close to friendly units for staging. It could also cause the enemy to devote additional units to base defense in safe havens or base camp areas. However, the amount of combat support assets required necessitate close scrutiny by the commander. The intelligence upon which -the raid operation is based must also be closely examined to. insure selective use of the technique against appropriate targets.

This raid was successful primarily because of rapid intelligence processing of-captured.-documents, thorough planning and coordination. of combat support, effective use of-combatpower to isolate the objective and prevent, enemy reinforcements and violent execution of a simple scheme of maneuver. Aggressive small unit leadership also played an important` role in maintaining the momentum of the-assault units. No new tactics or techniques were used: just current doctrine on raid force operations as contained in Marine Corps special operations manuals.