tomatic weapons fire was encountered along the hedgerows and fencelines and restricted the friendly advance. By L plus three hours the as­sault platoon had reached the church but only after heavy contact and close combat through­out the hamlet. No VC cadre was found and the decision was made to extract the company. At this time 26 enemy soldiers had been killed. The assault platoon began to fight its way out of the hamlet to the LZ but their inability to recover the body of a dead Marine prevented continued movement towards the zone. The dead Marine lay along a narrow trail covered by heavy auto­matic weapons fire and the platoon had taken several more casualties trying to extricate the body. Reinforcing squads entered the hamlet and after a close contact, including grenade ex­changes at ranges of 5-10 meters, recovered the body and assisted the assault platoon in fighting its way back to the Vill only with great difficulty did these platoons break contact and prepare to extract.

Extraction was completed under heavy contact with timely air and gunship strikes preventing the rapidly reinforcing enemy from encircling the company. Casualties were evacuated with the first wave as the zone had been too "hot" throughout the afternoon to allow periodic evacuation. Total results were 61 enemy KIA confirmed by the assault company, one enemy woman cadre captured and an estimated 75 enemy KIA from airstrikes. Friendly losses were five KIA and 21 WIA evacuated. Although it was never confirmed that the target cadre was in the hamlet, the raid was a success from the view­point of damage done to regular enemy units.

What then is the analysis of this operation with regard to the combat power expended? Before the raid is examined it is necessary to look closely at the dedicated assets required for what was essentially a one company operation.

For this raid 1/1 had two 105mm howitzer bat­teries in direct support, with priority of fires to the assault company. Other artillery dispositions were made throughout the division operational area to compensate for the above shifts and to

provide reinforcing fires should additional units be deployed into the objective area. Although the preponderance of close-in combat support was provided by fixed wing and gunship assets, artillery was necessary for suppression of long range fire, to assist in isolation of the objective area and to be prepared to provide intensive close-in support in the event bad weather or smoke obscured the LZ or objective area.

Preplanned and prearranged air support was extensive with the following techniques used:

   *reserve helicopter transports waiting in the pickup zone. Even though the assault company landed in two waves of six helos, there were eight CH-46's available for each wave. Reserve transports were held in the pickup zone in the event battle damage prevented other CH-46's from landing. These extra helos proved essential as the helicopter with the company command group was hit by ground fire prior to landing and was forced to abort and return to the pickup zone. The heliteam quickly boarded a reserve helo and landed with the second wave. The land­ing sequence was critical and the company had to execute a tactically sound landing and not be committed piecemeal into the zone because of lower than planned helicopter availability. The reinforcing company remained with the trans­port helicopters in the secure pickup zone throughout the afternoon and was capable of being employed without delay.

Marine Corps Gazette • June 1973