briefed; intensive preparations for the actual raid were underway. Detailed rehearsals were not conducted due to time and terrain limita­tions, but detailed "run throughs" were con­ducted on large scale aerial photos of the objec­tive area. Each man was thoroughly briefed on all aspects of the operation and alternate plans de­veloped and disseminated. Since the hamlet ap­peared fortified, each Marine carried demolition charges for breaching. Individual equipment consisted of POW tie ropes, two days supply of ammunition and one can of "heavies" C-rations. Flak jackets were worn to protect against mines, surprise firing devices and the expected cool weather.

A final meeting between the company commanders, airborne tactical air controller, aerial observers, helicopter flight leaders and battalion staff officers was held after the reconnaissance flight and last minute details and radio call signs agreed upon. D-day arrived and all forces were prepared to execute. Pre L-hour preparation of the LZ and objective area consisted only of fixed wing air strikes on the adjacent enemy areas (see Sketch 2). No strikes were made on the target hamlet in order to avoid having attacking units deploy through smoke and burning areas. The adjacent areas were struck to neutralize flanking fire positions which might cause initial helicop­ter waves difficulty. The assault company landed in two waves of six CH-46 helicopters each at exactly noon. Simultaneously with the final approach of the helicopter troop transports, two fixed wing aircraft laid a heavy smoke screen 1500 meters southwest of the objective area along the north-south railroad line. This was the enemy's main reinforcement and withdrawal route into the mountains and smoke protected the landing zone from long range fire and obser­vation.

 Additionally the smoke screen could cause the Viet Cong to think a chemical agent was being employed. Four helicopter gunships escorted the transports and struck targets of op­portunity during the landing.

Click on map for larger view

The helicopter gunships had been given blanket clearance outside the hamlet and LZ area be­cause the well defined objective area and rela­tively simple scheme of maneuver allowed immediate recognition of friendly troops by air­crewmen. This in turn enabled the gunships to rapidly strike targets of opportunity or fleeing enemy units without waiting for clearance from the ground commander. Backing up the gunship escorts were fixed wing aircraft on station under the control of the airborne tactical air controller. These aircraft conducted strikes and remained on station throughout the operation in order to completely isolate the objective area. The battal­ion commander and his operations officer flew in a command and control helicopter above the initial landing and assault into-the hamlet. This provided assistance in air-ground coordination and a command function should reinforcing units be necessary. No attempt was made to make decisions for the ground (assault company) commander. This is an important point in an age of instant communications and ready availability of command and control aircraft: In small unit operations tactical decisions should be left to the ground commander and no attempts should be made by airborne commanders or staff officers to impose their decisions on the ground com­mander.

The first platoon landed and secured the LZ in preparation for the assault platoons. Immedi­ately upon landing the two platoons encoun­tered heavy resistance and an impassable water barrier which forced an alternate plan. (Alter­nate plans had been coordinated and rehearsed thoroughly.) This prior planning "paid-off" greatly during the actual operation. This was ac­complished with no delay and required the southern platoon to block exits from the hamlet while the other assault platoon entered the area and attacked towards the church. A point of em­phasis is that alternate plans must be fully under­stood by all units and personnel to avoid delay in combat. Initial enemy resistance to the landing was overcome and by L plus 60 minutes the as­sault platoon had fought its way into the village and was approaching the church.

Initial enemy reaction was to leave a delaying force of approximately one company while other enemy personnel fled the hamlet. Heli­copter gunships and fixed.-wing aircraft placed strikes on fleeing enemy platoons trying to escape. from the objective area. At about L plus two hours Enemy forces began reinforcing the delaying troops apparently after noting the small assault force. Until this time no recognizable enemy cadre had been encountered. The enemy personnel, defending from camouflaged posi­tions, were all from main force units. Heavy au-

    

Marine Corps Gazette • June 1973  33

 

"Reprint from June l973 Marine Corps Gazette"

   Next page

   Back

   The Raid

   Charlie Company Home