courier traveling through the districts south of Danang with instructions for enemy cadre mem­bers to assemble at noon four days later in a cer­tain hamlet at a well known local church. Imme­diately after the meeting, the group of cadremen, estimated to be between 50-100, would move into the mountains for several weeks of sapper and demolition training.

Here was a commander's dream-hard in­telligence and an opportunity to hit the enemy where he could be severely hurt: in his well trained cadre leaders. The meeting place was outside the 1st Marine Division's tactical area of responsibility in an area where enemy forces possessed the capability to organize and defend in battalion strength with battalion size rein­forcements available within 3-6 hours march. In addition the meeting place was likely to be guarded by main force or North Vietnamese Army units. If a small attacking unit could time its attack with the noon meeting, maximum damage could be inflicted and withdrawal accomplished prior to substantial enemy reaction.

What type operation should have been con­ducted? The regimental commander's decision was to conduct a company size helicopterborne raid. Assignment of the mission "to kill or cap­ture the Viet Cong cadre" went to the 1st Battal­ion, 1st Marines. Combat support requirements for a helicopterborne raid are considerable and battalion planners quickly realized that even though only one company was scheduled to as­sault into the hamlet, the majority of the battal­ion, plus elements external to the battalion, regi­ment and division would be required. Current doctrine on raid operations stresses two impor­tant planning considerations: the ability of the enemy to reinforce or react to the raid and the ability of the raid force to isolate the objective area. The enemy's ability to reinforce was well known but isolation of the objective area, in this case, the entire hamlet where the meeting place was located, was a more difficult matter. To ac­complish the mission, sudden and violent in­troduction of forces into the hamlet area was essential; however, a rifle company of approx­imately 175 men could not physically isolate the objective area. The Marine air-ground team again provided a flexible response to a tac­tical problem-isolate the objective area with supporting arms.

Immediately upon capturing the courier's documents on 10 January, intelligence personnel began translating and processing. As the docu­ment was only one of many captured, in­telligence processing proceeded normally until the courier's instructions were found. The meet­ing was scheduled for 14 January, making plan­ning and coordination critical in time. Initial op­erational concepts envisioned one company, reinforced with normal attachments of engi­neers, artillery and mortar FO's and a ground­ based Forward Air Controller, inserted into Landing Zone WREN (see Sketch 1) at noon on 14 January. A second company from the battalion was to be standing by in a secure pickup zone for possible reinforcement of the assault company,

32           Marine Corps Gazette • June 1973

security for any downed aircraft and exploitation of targets of opportunity. Extraction would be accomplished by helicopter when the mission was accomplished or at approximately dusk that evening. The danger of enemy reinforcement was apparent and precluded the assault com­pany from staying in the hamlet longer than six hours without major reinforcement. Since this operation was a raid, the planning for withdrawal from the area was extremely important. In addi­tion to reinforcing companies from list Battalion, an immediate reaction company was on one hour alert and other regimental and division units could be maneuvered into the area within a few hours should major contact develop.

Click on map for larger view